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Abstract At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in
individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral
progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general
agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human
development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what
constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a
predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we
analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and
vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress
should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively
stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress
does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the
development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a
person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would
probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is
both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.
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1 Introduction
At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in
particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is
possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Parents and teachers would not teach
children that they should not hurt their pet, be kind to their siblings or explain why they should
not cheat at an exam if they did not believe that this would contribute to the moral
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improvement of children. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only
possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however.
For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of
individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and
development, or not? Is the kind of progress we might make as adults of the same kind as that
we might make in our growth to adulthood, or is a different notion of progress at play here? In
this paper we approach these questions through analyses of, firstly, the concept of moral
progress (Section 2) and secondly, the psychology of moral development (Section 3). Thus, we
use the literature on the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral
development and vice versa; and we will see that both analyses mutually support each other.
Section 4 will be devoted to a comparison of the moral progress of children and that of adults.
We will end with a summary of our findings and some concluding remarks.
2 The Concept of Moral Progress
To clarify the notion of moral progress we will distinguish (1) a strong and a weak concept, (2)
different levels on which progress may take place, and (3) formal and substantial criteria of
moral progress.
2.1 The Weak and the Strong Concept of Progress
The core of the concept of progress is ‘things getting better’. But is there more to it than that?
In everyday life we often speak of progress when things at a certain time are better than they
were at a previous time. For instance, a parent may look at a child’s school report, notice that
on average the child has received higher grades and say that the child has made progress. In the
literature the concept of progress is sometimes explained this way, as simply a combination of
a descriptive element (the observed change) and a normative or evaluative element (the
evaluation of the observed change) (Macklin 1977: 372–373). More often, however, a further
element is added to the concept of progress. Perhaps the child was lucky to get better grades;
the exam questions just happened to fall right. To be able to speak of progress it seems we need
to know more about the background of the change, and have reason to think the observed
‘trend’ will consolidate itself, will indeed be a trend.
The distinction introduced above is that between a weak and a strong concept of progress.
The former defines progress simply as positively evaluated change; the latter adds a condition,
which we may call (indicating its extreme form) irreversibility. This formal criterion can be
found in philosophy of history, as a thesis on the progress of civilization or mankind (see Bury
1987: 2; Van Doren 1967: 3; Nisbet 1980: 4–5), but also in developmental psychology,
particularly in Kohlberg’s work (Kohlberg 1984).
We see the weak and the strong concept as the extremes of a spectrum. Complete
irreversibility is unthinkable: any (moral) progress made by individuals or societies can also
be undone. Think for example of people who come under the spell of an evil leader or societies
that harden against non-indigenous citizens. The weak concept is too thin, however, too
superficial: to be able to speak of progress the causes of the change need to be more than
incidental, they need to have firm roots in the subject of progress, so that we can be reasonably
confident in the stability and sustainability of the change. A slightly stronger concept would
recognize these claims, but refrain from making any claims about the (im)possibility of
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regress. The change could be the result of intentional effort, yet be completely reversible in
case the effort was aborted. For instance, a child might make progress on the piano, but fall
back again due to lack of practice.1 This is indeed a normal manner of speaking in everyday
life. However, when it comes to considered judgements of progress, it still seems too weak – it
misses something important, namely the idea that the observed change for the better is not
superficial, but the external expression of an internal or underlying change. Hence, we will
speak of progress only in cases of positive change that cannot be wholly undone without
difficulty. In other words: progress is positive development, where development means
durable, non-superficial, change. Someone who, through serious practice, makes progress at
the piano, may fall back through lack of practice, but it is unlikely that she will return to her
pre-practice level, unless she does not play the piano for a substantial period of time;
furthermore, the fact that she will most likely need less practice than the first time to regain
her previous top level, suggests that an ‘internal’ change has indeed taken place.2
This concept leaves room for stronger and weaker conceptions of progress – depending on
where one places the (formal or substantial) threshold for speaking of progress – and for stronger
and weaker forms or types of progress. In this paper we will make use of the second distinction.
A helpful image here is that of a stone that is being rolled up a hill. In one (extreme) case –
the weak concept of progress – the slope is even and steep; as soon as the upward force
exercised on the stone slackens a bit too much, the stone rolls all the way back down again. In
the other (extreme) case – the strong concept of progress – the slope is not even, but
characterized by hollow ridges; the stone is pushed up the hill for a bit, to rest on the next
ridge, and so on. It would take an effort to dislodge it from such a ridge and make it roll down
again, and it would not roll all the way back down, but only to the next ridge. This latter image
can be tweaked in many ways: the ridges may be close together or further apart, and the edges
of the ridges may be higher or lower, so that it would require more or less effort to dislodge the
stone. The image also makes clear that absolute irreversibility is impossible: landslides caused
by erosion or some other cause can occur even on the most stable of mountains. To be sure, the
image we use here should not be taken to suggest that all progress is necessarily intentional,
the result of a conscious purposive effort. Especially in the case of young children this is
seldom the case. We will return to this in Section 4.
2.2 Progress as Improvement and Progress as Development towards an End-State
According to one conception progress is nothing more than (relatively durable or stable)
improvement, whereas another, teleological, conception emphasizes the idea of a final goal or
end-statewhich is (to be) approached or attained (Godlovitch 1998).3 Whereas the teleological
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for offering this suggestion, including the example.
2 It seems plausible that this criterion – that the concept of ‘progress’ only applies in case of positive change that
cannot be undone without difficulty – applies even more strongly in the case of moral progress, given the nature
of the change involved (for which see Section 3). It seems plausible, for instance, that progress in moral
convictions or moral sensitivity can only be undone with difficulty, through force of (bad) reasons or circum-
stances. An important difference between piano playing and moral functioning is that whereas one can avoid
practicing the piano, one cannot avoid moral functioning. Insofar as one has made real – as opposed to merely
apparent – progress, therefore, it is difficult to see how this can be lost merely as a result of ‘lack of practice’.
3 Two remarks are called for here: 1) For Godlovitch the notion of teleological progress implies nothing about the
(positive) value of the change in question; we, however, view the teleological model as a model of progress. 2)
Godlovitch also distinguishes a third kind of progress, which he calls ‘raw progress’, as in ‘charting the progress
of X’. Because this concerns observed change or movement unaccompanied by evaluation we will leave it aside.
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conception, so Godlovitch argues, assumes that there is a fixed standard (the final goal or end-
state) by which progress must be measured, according to the other conception we can speak of
improvement as soon as a situation is in some respect preferable over an earlier situation.
According to the conception of progress as improvement, Godlovitch claims, the criterion of
progress will be changeable and depend on the wider context and the demands this makes; it
will be ‘relative to certain operative pressures at a time’ and ‘to some interest’ (ibid.: 275). The
criterion has some stability – otherwise the situations could not be compared – but because the
‘operative pressures (...) themselves change’ the stability or constancy will be relative and
temporary (idem). In our view it is better to separate these issues (improvement v. end-state
and changeable v. fixed standard); they do not necessarily coincide. We will address the
question of the stability of the standard in 2.4.
Sequences of events are said, by Godlovitch, to be ‘strongly teleological’ when we know
what a certain development will culminate in and should culminate in, as is the case (roughly),
for instance, with the development of a foetus. They are said to be weakly teleological when
we do not have that knowledge but can still with some justification treat the sequence of events
under consideration as if it were culminative. The climax hypothesis in ecology, which states
that ecosystems tend towards a stable state (with a certain mixture of flora and fauna), would
be an example of that (ibid.: 274).4
The distinction between ‘improvement’ and teleological progress can be nuanced and
qualified, but there is a real difference at stake: in the former case there is no developed
‘picture’ of an end-state; instead criteria are used that are at most pieces of such a picture.5 This
means there is much room for different directions of development, and development need not
be aimed at a clearly demarcated endpoint. In practice – not least the practices of childrearing
and education – this seems to be the default situation.
Godlovitch sees moral progress as a hybrid of improvement and global (which for
him means: at the level of species, entire civilizations, or whole human domains, such
as art, science, and politics), weakly teleological progress; his focus is on the societal
level (see below). He rightly points out that we cannot say what the goal of
(collective) moral development is as long as our knowledge is ‘incomplete’ (which
we take to be necessarily the case). Neither the conception of individual progress we
defend here, nor our conception(s) of collective progress, assume that there is one fixed final
goal. To be able to speak of moral progress we need no more than a (relatively) stable standard;
and there may be more than one standard. What kind of standard(s) we need and have at our
disposal is the subject of the 2.4.
2.3 Individual and Collective Moral Progress
Very roughly, (moral) progress may take place on two levels: that of individuals, and that of
collectives. Individual moral progress refers to the moral-psychological development of an
individual; when an individual develops in a desirable direction in the moral domain (so
undergoes durable positive change) this constitutes moral progress.
4 Godlovitch also distinguishes between local and global (in his terms ‘broad) teleological progress, but in a
somewhat different way than we have done.
5 Cf. Amartya Sen’s (2009) critique of John Rawls: we do not require an ideal picture of a just society in order to
be able to make progress in this area.
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Collective moral progress is a vaguer notion. It might refer to biologically based progress of
the human species or human populations, to cultural-historically grounded progress of civili-
zations or societies or again humanity as a whole, or a combination of both. It might also
indicate progress of smaller collectives or organizations. It might be helpful to distinguish two
interpretations of collective moral progress: 1) Generational progress. This is progress of
‘groups’ of people, measured in terms of the average moral ‘quality’ of the individuals of a
certain generation. ‘Group’ has no substantive meaning here; it denotes a collection of
individuals – e.g. all British citizens born in the sixties. 2) Societal progress, which is assessed
on both an institutional (e.g. laws) and a practical level (e.g. the moral quality of people’s
conversation in (social) media). We will not elaborate on this here, however, since our focus
will be on individual moral progress.
A further important distinction is that between local and global progress. The former
denotes progress in a limited number of (sub)domains of moral concern or aspects of moral
functioning, whereas the latter indicates progress across (virtually) all (sub)domains of moral
concern and aspects of moral functioning (cf. Moody-Adams 1999: 169). Local progress in
aspects of moral functioning occurs, for instance, when an individual’s moral reasoning
improves, while his moral sensitivity, motivation, and affect more generally remain the same.
Progress that is local in terms of domains of moral concern may occur when a society becomes
more sensitive to issues of discrimination, but remains highly unequal socio-economically, or,
to give another example, when an individual’s commitment to ethical consumption grows
stronger while the moral quality of his dealings with others in the personal sphere remains the
same. Just as progress may be ‘weaker’ or ‘stronger’, it can also be more or less local or global.
2.4 Formal and Substantial Criteria of Progress
The weak and the strong concept of progress use different formal criteria to define progress;
for example, according to the strong concept a necessary condition for a change to be able to
count as progress is that the change is irreversible. But inherent in both concepts of progress
and in any conception of progress is the notion of things getting better, and this implies the use
of substantial criteria. Are there such criteria available to us when it comes to moral progress,
and if so, what kind of criteria are they?
As explained above, Godlovitch (1998: 275) distinguishes teleological progress – progress
towards an end state – from progress as improvement (without reference to a final goal), and
ties these to the distinction between using a stable criterion and using changeable criteria,
norms that are constant so long as certain ‘interests’ or ‘operative pressures’ remain in place.
We do not see progress as necessarily bound up with the idea of an end state, but neither do we
favour the use of wholly relative criteria. The problem with the latter is that a historical or
developmental episode may be labelled as ‘progress’ at one point, from one perspective, and
‘regress’ at another time, from a different perspective; this renders talk of moral progress rather
empty. A third option seems to be to use stable criteria that are not wholly relative to current
interests (without positing an end state); a set of moral principles by which we measure
progress. Macklin (1977) proposes two such principles: ‘the principle of humaneness’ and ‘the
principle of humanity’ (which concerns respect for human dignity). Roth (2012: 385) sees this
as a variant of the utopian model (her name for teleological conceptions), which she rejects
because our standards or criteria are also subject to change, and she does not believe there is a
final, unchanging standard behind all this. Her own Deweyan approach sees progress in terms
of increasing problem-solving capacity. Roth (2012: 391) uses the term ‘problem’ to indicate
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Ba certain sort of experience of ourselves, our beliefs, our values, and the world. Problems arise
when we experience trouble, difficulty, or conflict – when there is disharmony amongst our
empirical beliefs, our values, and our experience of living.^ People approach any problem
from somewhere – their background values – but even these can be revised (ibid.: 396).
Progress is measured by asking: did the problem we start out with disappear or diminish? Has
the number of problems we are faced with decreased?
Michele Moody-Adams also points out that in practice – and justifiedly – we do not
measure progress according to some fully specified final goal that our views and actions ought
to tend towards, but that we observe moral progress locally, in limited ‘domains of concern’
(1999: 169). Progress in moral convictions, for instance, is a matter of increasing understand-
ing of the ‘semantic depth’ of moral concepts: we gain a sharper view of the richness and the
scope of a concept, and come to see why a new interpretation of a moral concept
does more justice to moral experience (idem; she refers to Platts 1988 here).
According to Moody-Adams we have no immutable moral principles at our disposal,
but we do have fairly reliable, context-dependent signs of moral progress. As an
example she suggests that whenever a proposed institution or practice can be upheld
without extreme violence and with minimal compulsion it will often be the case that
its realisation points to moral progress. When a certain society does not notice the
evil of slavery, this has to do, in Moody-Adams’ view, with a refusal to critically reflect on
its own practices. Thus, Moody-Adams comes closer than Roth to arguing for universal and
unchanging standards.
As mentioned, in our view the plausibility of speaking of (moral) progress is undermined
when criteria of progress are (too) changeable and relative. All progress would then be
‘progress’ – progress for as long as we use these criteria. Roth’s proposal to use a formal
criterion instead of a substantive one also fails, however. To begin with, a (moral) ‘problem’
can be anything that is perceived as such by some people. Roth gives the example of teenage
pregnancy, saying that ‘[p]resumably, most Americans would agree that ‘teen preg-
nancy’ is a problem’ (2012: 392). Maybe, but what about homosexuality, for instance?
Is that a moral problem? It was certainly perceived as such by most people in the
past, and many people today believe it is morally problematic; and yet the problem
may lie not with homosexuality as such but with the moral views of those who
condemn it. And when does a problem count as solved? When people stop perceiving
it as a problem? If the example is homosexuality we are inclined to say yes, but
others would disagree, and Roth cannot offer a way out without abandoning pragmatism in
favour of a more objectivist approach. The problem-solving conception of moral progress begs
the question if it offers no independent criteria by which to judge whether a problem has been
solved or not.
What we are saying here, then, is that a purely constructivist approach to moral progress is
untenable; does that mean we are committed to realism about moral progress? Jamieson (2002:
321) describes the problem as follows: moral realism respects our intuitions about moral
progress but conflicts with our metaphysical sensibilities, because these have a problem with
‘facts’ that are intrinsically motivating. The constructivist perspective, on the other hand, may
be able to deal with the specific nature of moral ‘facts’, but flies in the face of strong intuitions
about real cases of moral progress. There is no need to choose between either extreme,
however (and neither does Jamieson, who develops a kind of pragmatism with objectivist
elements). Roth’s pragmatism aims at an intermediate position but in our view her position
collapses into constructivism (or relativism). Wilson (2010) also seeks an intermediate
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position: ‘moral progress without moral realism’, according to which moral beliefs can be true
or false, even though there is no such thing as an independent moral reality. Moral truths, like
scientific truths, are the outcome of specific processes of theory change. What Wilson
explicitly rejects is robust moral realism (as defended, for instance, by Railton [1986]
and Shafer-Landau [2005]), which entails a commitment to the metaphysical claim
that the truth of moral claims depends on their correspondence with real moral facts
and properties that are metaphysically on a par with non-moral facts and properties.
But Wilson is willing to claim truth status for certain moral beliefs, and the opposite
for others, such as the belief that homosexuality is unacceptable (110). Thus, she does
seem to embrace a form of objectivism similar to that accepted by minimal moral
realism, which (unlike Wilson) remains agnostic on the metaphysical issue but holds
on to the possibility of objective moral truth.6 Whether or not objectivism without
realism is ultimately defensible, it is objectivism we need in order to be able to speak
sensibly of moral progress. Of the positions available in the literature on moral progress,
Moody-Adams’ view seems to us best suited to do justice both to moral objectivism and the
contextual nature of morality.
With Moody-Adams (1999) we suggest that moral progress be measured by means of
ongoing interpretations of moral experience and moral concepts, which we assume are
characterized by certain inescapable aspects that we need to do justice to – the kind of aspects
Macklin points to (in a way, to be sure, coloured by the dominant ethical traditions of her
time). There is a sense in which experience per se has a moral character, if ‘experience’ is
understood as ‘something speaking to us’, as our ‘being addressed by something’ that calls for
interpretation (Van Tongeren 1994: 203). It is part of being human that we seek and are
receptive to meaning, rather than indifferent to it. But moral experience is also moral in a more
familiar sense: it is experience in which Bwe are summoned or obliged to commit
ourselves to, or continue in, a certain way of acting or relating, or praxis, which is at
the same time understood as being part of real or good human life^ (ibid.: 204).
Although our answer to such an address is always contextual and dependent on an
interest on our part, it is at the same time still a response to a normative demand.
Social contexts are highly changeable, a fact with obvious implications for which
moral considerations apply in various circumstances, and for how we might morally
assess past practices. But the moral experience of people throughout history is
recognisable for us as moral experience; and this allows us to enter into a dialogue
about decreasing or increasing moral sensitivity and insight. In a similar vein
Weischedel (1967: 89) suggests that the differing moral ideals of different periods
may be seen as varying answers to the same basic question, which he sees as the question,
or task, of balancing two sides of human nature: our individuality and our social nature – for
without others we could not be ourselves (ibid.: 91).
We will not defend a particular substantive conception of moral progress here; what follows
is predicated on the assumption that substantive moral progress – in a stronger sense than
Roth’s – is possible, i.e. that some ways of being and doing are morally better than others and
that it is possible to develop such that one becomes morally better. Our description of
individual moral progress will be largely formal, and in so far as it involves substantial criteria
these will remain fairly abstract.
6 The distinction between robust and minimal moral realism was coined by Nicholas Sturgeon (1985).
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3 Individual Moral Development
Moral psychologists study the development of children and adolescents in the moral domain.
Earlier we used the term ‘development’ to refer to durable, non-superficial change, regardless
of whether this change is deemed to be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. In psychology, however – and
above all in moral psychology – the term ‘development’ is used exclusively to denote positive
change with a durable, non-superficial character. ‘Development’, in this field, is not a neutral
term, but is equivalent with ‘progress’. Claims about development therefore presuppose
normative principles. All work in this area is based, either explicitly or implicitly, on a theory
of moral progress that is connected with ideas about the characteristics of the morally mature
and the development towards moral maturity, even if it (only) concerns an aspect (cognition for
instance) of moral development. There are two ways in which this may be the case. One
possibility is that psychologists, with or without being aware of it, subscribe to such a theory
and the meta-ethical and normative-ethical commitments it implies. It is quite clear that when
Lawrence Kohlberg, Martin Hoffman, William Damon, August Blasi, but also people like
John Gibbs and Lawrence Walker – to name a few important authors in this area not discussed
below – write about moral development they are not distancing themselves from the
(normative) concepts of morality and moral maturity involved, but are instead quite committed
to them. They are concerned to discover and do justice to what morality is and how it is or
becomes anchored in human psychology, rather than work on the basis of an assumed or
taken-for-granted hypothetical. Just to illustrate: Gibbs (2014) explicitly sets out to develop a
theory of morality; Matsuba and Walker (2005) begin their paper as follows: BWithin the last
century, the world has witnessed some of the most heinous crimes against humanity. Yet, even
in our darkest hours there were glimpses of hope that the world could be a kinder and gentler
place; a place where the poor and dying could find love, acceptance, and dignity; and where all
people are treated equal.^
Another, currently perhaps more favoured option, is to adopt such a theory – or, more
loosely, the common understanding of morality prevalent in a certain social group at a certain
time – for the purposes of research without subscribing to it, i.e. while remaining agnostic
about its meta-ethical and normative claims. Grazyna Kochanska, for instance, who writes
about conscience as ‘an inner guiding system responsible for the gradual emergence and
maintenance of of self-regulation’ (Kochanska and Aksan 2006: 1587) tries to avoid normative
or meta-ethical commitments. Baillargeon et al. (2014), to give another example, employ an
evolutionary understanding of (infant) ‘sociomoral reasoning’ that seems to be based on an
implicit agreement about what comes under this heading, without however implying meta-
ethical or normative commitments in any stronger sense. And Kagan (2008), being Bconcerned
primarily with universals in the development of morality^ (ibid.: 308) similarly avoids
particular meta-ethical and normative commitments. It is important to note, however, that
the absence of meta-ethical and normative-ethical commitments does not entail the absence of
assumptions about the moral domain, moral maturity, and so on; they are still necessary in
order to study moral development, even if they are only accepted as hypotheticals. Moreover,
authors may be more or less explicit about their assumptions in various publications. For
instance, Gil Diesendruck and Avi Benozio, who have researched bias and prosocial behaviour
towards ingroup and outgroup members, are silent on their normative views in the one
(Benozio and Diesendruck 2015), but end on an explicitly normative note in the other:
BOne of the implications of the above portrayal of children to educators is that, if we leave
children to figure out the social world on their own, they might end up developing fairly
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discriminatory and biased dispositions. In other words, educators need to actively engage in
curbing children’s predisposed biases^ (Diesendruck and Benozio 2015:4).
Either way, the study of moral development presupposes some demarcation of the moral
domain, some view of what it means to be morally mature, and some conception of
development.
The study of moral development presupposes a description of the moral domain, because if
we cannot distinguish the moral from the non-moral, we cannot make any claims about moral
development. Moral psychologists therefore need to adopt a meta-ethical position with regard
to the nature of the moral. Secondly, it presupposes a characterization of the moral adult or the
morally mature person, as someone who has developed in the moral domain towards a level
that we normally expect adults to attain. That means that moral psychologists also need to
employ a normative-ethical theory, from which criteria can be derived to judge what is morally
good or desirable. Thirdly, the concept of development needs to be fleshed out. Psychologists
can be categorized according to their answers to two questions in this regard, namely the
question whether development is linear, and the question whether there is a universal devel-
opmental pattern. Answers to these questions are backed up by logical as well as empirical
arguments. That moral development can be characterized as ‘irreversible’ (in the sense that it is
a strong form of progress) is generally accepted by moral psychologists.
3.1 Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development
Moral development, in Kohlberg’s view, is the development of moral reasoning ability. He
famously distinguished six universal developmental stages with a fixed, logically and empir-
ically necessary order among them. Progression through these stages is held to be irreversible.
The final stage – the goal of moral development – is that of the just person, someone who
autonomously subscribes to and acts in accordance with the principle of justice.
The reasons why Kohlberg focussed on moral reasoning and judgement were varied. First
of all, he described the moral domain as situations characterized by conflicts of interest that
call for an impartial solution (see Lapsley 1996: 129). A person who is able to weigh interests
in an adequate, impartial manner is someone who does justice to other people. For Kohlberg,
being able to do justice to others is what most strongly characterizes the moral adult. This
shows us – and this is the second reason for his focus on reasoning – how strongly Kohlberg
was influenced by Kant’s deontological moral theory (which meant that he rejected utilitari-
anism). Empathic abilities that enable people to put themselves in other people’s shoes are, in
the end, subsidiary. The only thing that is morally relevant about our actions is the reasoning
behind it. ‘Doing the right thing’ means: doing whatever you do for the right reasons, reasons
that are universalizable. Thirdly, Kohlberg held an internalist view of the relation between
thinking and acting; he assumed, especially in his later work, that the combination of a moral
judgement (that a certain moral rule applies in a certain way in the situation at hand) and a
responsibility judgement (specifying whose responsibility it is to act; a judgement that in
higher stages would coincide with the moral judgement) would automatically lead to moral
action (cf. Bergman 2002).
To sum up: Kohlberg describes moral progress as irreversible improvement of moral
reasoning. Progress continues until only reasons are used that are really relevant: reasons
relating to the universalizability of the (proposed) action. A person who undergoes this
development and is, in the end, only motivated by truly moral considerations has at the same
time become autonomous, i.e. he is not driven by emotions, nor determined by conventions of
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his society or tradition. In the past decennia Kohlberg’s theory – and with it his conception of
moral progress – has drawn increasing criticism. Psychologists have defended alternative
theories of moral development, which differ from Kohlberg’s in their view of the moral
domain, moral maturity, and development.
3.2 A Broader Conception of the Moral Domain
The first point of critique is that Kohlberg’s description of the moral domain is too narrow, and
offers a too restricted conception of individual moral progress. There is more to morality than
justice, and there is more to justice than resolving conflicts of interest impartially. Furthermore,
we can conceive of types of moral exemplariness that do not obviously resemble the
Kohlbergian stage six. Think of Mother Theresa, for instance, whose motives and actions
should be described in terms of care for others and concern for their well-being.
A more expansive view of the moral domain can be found in the work of Hoffman (2000)
and Eisenberg (1992). Hoffman and Eisenberg believe that morality is not primarily about
justice but also or even foremost about beneficence, doing good for others, also in situations
where this does not serve one’s self-interest – in other words about prosocial behaviour.
Furthermore, besides cognition they see emotions as essential components of morality. They
therefore study the development of empathy and sympathy. Hoffman distinguishes five stages
in the development of empathy. Progress through these stages is driven mostly by cognitive
development, by the ability to distinguish self and other and to take another person’s
perspective in such a way that one is increasingly capable of meeting others’ needs.
Cognitive abilities seem to play a larger role in Hoffman’s theory than emotions do in
Kohlberg’s. The idea that moral emotions are an essential characteristic of the moral person
is, in our view, an improvement on Kohlberg’s conception. From a psychological point of view
they play an important part in moral development and moral motivation; from a moral
perspective, an action that is motivated purely by an intellectual sense of duty seems to us
less praiseworthy than action that is (also) characterized by emotional concern and authentic
interest (see also Marples 2014).
3.3 A more Comprehensive Characterization of Moral Maturity
Kohlberg’s internalistic view that a person’s level of moral reasoning will necessarily lead to a
certain level of moral behaviour has been proven to be untenable. Moral psychologists have
convincingly shown (as moral philosophers have done on theoretical grounds as well, it should
be added) that moral behaviour is an ‘exceedingly complex phenomenon’ (Rest in Bergman
2002: 110) for which a moral person not only needs moral reasoning skills, but also moral
emotions and moral motivation. To become good moral persons children have to learn and
internalise a variety of qualities. Moreover, while these moral aspects can be theoretically
distinguished, and while people can be better or worse in either one of them, characteristic of a
good moral person is that these aspects are integrated into a coherent whole and part of a
person’s self-perception.
In moral psychology (broadly conceived, including philosophical moral psychology) we
find two types of theory in which this integration is studied. On the one hand there is the
research on moral identity development, instigated by Blasi (1984). Phrased in various ways,
theories on moral identity argue that people are more likely to act morally if moral consider-
ations, and these might be judgements, emotions or ideals, are better integrated with other
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aspects of people’s identity and/or more central to the person’s perception/narrative/conception
of herself (see Bergman 2002). On the other hand there are various theories on character
development, for instance positive psychology (e.g. Peterson 2006) and virtue ethics (see for
instance Carr and Steutel 1999). These theories entail different views on development and its
preconditions, but they all suggest that the idea of the development of a moral identity can also
be related to virtue. Moral identity can be described as the moral virtues and values that are
characteristic of people (both in their own eyes and those of others), in combination with
people’s narratives about who they wish or hope to be. Thus, as we take it, a person’s moral
identity is not confined to the moral traits or values the person actually has, but may also
include a conception or an image of an ideal moral self (e.g. Blasi 1984, 1993; Hardy and
Carlo 2005). This aspect of moral identity may be a special source of moral behaviour and
dispositions (see for instance Rorty and Wong 1993) and add to the robustness of one’s
morality: one wants to be a moral person who contributes to the fairness of society.
Importantly, both types of theory stress that moral development is a lifelong project. Moral
integration, as Blasi sees it, is not fully achieved with the transition from childhood to
adulthood; and the same goes for complete and perfect virtuousness (see for instance
Sanderse 2012).
In Ann Colby and William Damon’s work (1992), integration of self and morality is
explained in terms also of the increasing centrality of morality in a person’s identity. In our
view this is not and need not be the aim of moral development in general, and is not the only
way to interpret moral integration. Morality does not have to constitute the core of one’s
identity (although it cannot be completely peripheral), but it does have to be integrated with
other aspects of one’s identity (see 3.5).
3.4 A more Realistic Conception of Moral Development
Finally, the idea that moral development proceeds through stages, as Kohlberg proposed, can
be found in many theories of moral development. Hoffman describes stages in the develop-
ment of empathy. Gertrud Nunner-Winkler does so for the development of moral motivation.
Rest distinguishes stages in the development of various components of moral functioning.
Development need not be linear, however. Nunner-Winkler, for instance, describes temporary
declines in moral motivation during the development to adulthood (2007: 142). And Larry
Nucci and Elliot Turiel (2009) found evidence in their research for differences between
cognitive and moral development. In the latter there seem to be transitional phases in which
children seem to regress. They speak of a ‘U-shaped pattern’ that occurs during adolescence.
Because older children and younger adolescents can process more information than younger
children and encounter more diverse situations, they will need some time to reorient them-
selves morally. Their moral judgements can therefore be more variable. In terms of the image
of the stone being rolled up the hill we used earlier: there will be periods of stability and even
of seeming regress, and sometimes a higher goal can only be reached via an indirect route.
3.5 Evaluation
This brief venture into the field of moral psychology yields three insights. Firstly the
observation that individual moral progress entails the development of different aspects or
components of moral functioning across various domains of moral concern (such as interper-
sonal morality and more abstract issues of justice). The less consistent the progress across these
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components and domains is, the more local moral progress is. For most of us moral progress is
not entirely global, but to some extent patchy. The second insight, therefore, concerns the
importance of integration of the various components of moral functioning (as they function in
the various domains of moral concern) both with each other and in a person’s identity and self-
concept. The more a person is able to construct a coherent whole out of the moral and non-
moral aspects of her identity, and the more robust her identity is, the more morally developed
she is. That does not mean that the moral dimension of her identity needs to become
increasingly central, as Colby and Damon have suggested. In our view, moral development
primarily concerns the degree of robustness of a person’s moral identity, not its centrality.
Morality should occupy a fitting place (that cannot be wholly peripheral), but it does not have
to dominate all other domains of life. Moral development need not culminate in moral
exemplariness or sainthood, but only in moral solidity. The third insight is that in the moral
domain people can develop in different directions, towards different forms of moral maturity or
even exemplariness – not just along the lines of ‘care’ and ‘justice’ (that have been unneces-
sarily strongly opposed), but also in the degree to which and the manner in which they are
touched by specific (kinds of) moral issues.
A difficult question, of course, is what counts as a ‘fitting’ place for morality. At issue here
is not the discussion between those who see ‘being a self [as] inseparable from existing in a
space of moral issues’ (Taylor 1989, cited in Lapsley 2008) and those for whom morality is
relatively separate from the rest of the personality, but rather the question how much weight
should be given to moral considerations and moral qualities as opposed to other considerations
and other valuable qualities – an issue also raised, famously, by Bernard Williams (1981,
1985) in terms of the distinction between the moral and the ethical.7 We cannot give more than
a tentative suggestion of an answer here. Both objective and subjective criteria come into play.
Objectively, morality has a fitting place in a person’s identity when she only rarely gives
precedence to non-moral matters over important moral ones. ‘Important’ now calls for
explanation, that is best given in the form of an example. When someone has the disposition
not to fulfil explicitly made promises whenever he does not feel like fulfilling the promise,
morality occupies a small place – too small a place – in his identity. Fitting would be to be
disposed to fulfil such promises. But one or two exceptions to such a disposition, on the other
hand, would not mean that morality has no fitting place in a person’s identity.
Why should we settle for a ‘fitting place’? Why would increasing robustness of the moral
dimension of a person’s identity be the goal of moral development and an adequate view of
individual moral progress, rather than increasing centrality of the moral element? When
morality has a fitting and robustly anchored place in a person’s identity, the necessary
condition for progress is met that the change needs to be durable and non-superficial.
Nothing is thereby said about the contents of moral identity. These can continue to develop,
for instance through experience and increased understanding. When both the contents and the
robustness of a person’s moral identity are evaluated positively, we also know enough to be
able to speak of progress. But would increasing centrality of the moral element not make for
more progress?
7 Other important reference points here are the utilitarian Singer (1972), who defended a notoriously demanding
view of our moral obligations, and Richard Hare (1952, 1981), with his interesting mix of utilitarian and Kantian
ethics, who saw it as part of the way we think about morality that moral considerations always ‘override’ other
considerations, Williams is one of the best-known critics of utilitarianism (Smart and Williams 1973). To review
this debate falls outside the scope of this article.
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In our view the character of moral progress changes when it goes beyond the robustness of
a fitting place. Until then moral progress is both progress within the moral domain and, other
things being equal, progress as a person as a whole. But beyond this point the danger arises
that moral progress comes to overshadow other aspects of a person, aspects that may be
equally important to herself or to others. It may be possible to capture some of these other
aspects in a broader conception of morality – aspects like pleasantness and agreeableness, for
instance – but some aspects, like creative or cognitive qualities, will fall outside of even such a
broad conception. We prefer, therefore, to align our conception of individual moral progress
more closely with a more general notion of becoming a better person. We therefore conceive of
it in terms of the integration and increasing robustness of the moral aspect of a person’s
identity, in which it comes to occupy a fitting place. This is not meant to suggest that this type
of progress should necessarily be rated above the other type, in which morality comes to
occupy a more central place in a person’s identity. Whether the latter is a good thing overall
depends on a person’s other qualities and traits that codetermine what fits her (a second
objective criterion). It also depends on a person’s own experience and her own perception of
what is fitting for her – and that is the subjective criterion.
4 The Moral Progress of Children and of Adults
There is no reason for serious scepticism about the notion of individual moral progress. Not
only is it a coherent notion, but both everyday experience and empirical research also strongly
suggest that individual moral progress is possible and occurs regularly. In fact, children’s moral
development seems to offer strong support for the notion of moral progress, and
moral education seems to be predicated on the possibility of making progress in this
area. Unless the idea of moral education is incoherent or illusory, strong moral
relativism or scepticism is untenable. For surely, the moral judgement of an eighteen-year-
old is, on average, more adequate than that of a toddler. And we would be in a bad state if our
moral sensitivity and empathic abilities did not progress beyond infancy. In short, moral
development is real.
Yet we do not normally speak of children’s moral development in terms of ‘moral
progress’. Likewise, we do not say that a child who has developed ‘normally’ in the moral
domain has become a ‘better person’ (even if we confine ‘better’ to its moral sense). We
implicitly use age-appropriate standards. An egocentric toddler is not a bad person; an
egocentric adult is (to some extent, at least). At least until someone has reached a ‘mature’
equilibrium – and thus has ‘completed’ the cognitive, emotional, social, and moral develop-
ment considered normal for children and adolescents – we speak of moral development only,
and it would seem out of place to speak of moral progress.
This is different for adults. It is not that in the case of adults we commonly speak of moral
progress – and it is quite normal to say that moral development continues throughout
adulthood – but it does not strike us as odd to speak of moral progress here, nor to say that
someone has become a better person (even in the moral sense of ‘better’ alone). In adulthood
moral progress is also a real possibility, as many people will know from their own experience.
But here progress is hard-won, in what can easily feel like an uphill battle. For adults, moral
progress is a project: it may require tremendous effort to push the stone up the hill to the next
stable position. Such a position, in this image, signifies that certain ways of thinking, feeling,
and acting have become habitual; and because to change bad habits and develop good ones is
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difficult, moral progress in adulthood tends to be slow (if it occurs at all). And perhaps the
image of ridges on the slope, of stable positions, is actually too optimistic if it suggests that
maintenance is not needed to sustain our good habits. They may be dislodged not just by
positive force, but also through laziness and inaction.
To some extent this is true for children, too, but in their case habits will be less deeply
ingrained, and furthermore, there are always others pushing their stone uphill. Parents and to a
lesser extent other educators are responsible for the moral development of children, and can be
held to account if they do not fulfil their role. Moreover, the process of socialization and the
demands of interacting with peers take children’s moral development in their wake. We noted
in 2.1 that progress need not be the result of intentional effort, and that it rarely is in the case of
young children. Yet we cannot truly speak of moral progress until the child comes to ‘own’ it;
in that sense moral progress is never something that merely happens to someone – there is
always some (not necessarily conscious or explicit) ‘activity’ on the part of the ‘subject of
progress’ required in order to make it actual progress. Still, children’s progress is strongly
driven by factors other than their own striving. For adults, despite the many forms of invisible
support a society provides for people’s moral functioning, the moral progress they make is
largely up to them. It is also much more a matter of refining sensitivities, strengthening
commitments and virtues, and deepening understanding (among others of the ‘semantic depth’
of our concepts, as Moody-Adams suggested), than of making developmental leaps. Once you
have become capable of ‘empathy beyond the situation’ (Hoffman), for instance, progress lies
in the consistency and fullness with which you use this capacity.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this article we have drawn several conclusions with regard to moral progress. These can be
summarised in the following points. We have argued that: moral progress is a coherent notion;
moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis
of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation;
moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best
conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust
integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally – even though
we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children – but adults’ moral
progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a
collective effort.
As said, our considerations here are largely formal. An interesting possibility, however, is
that of substantive moral progress through the improvement of moral views, or the principles
adhered to. This might even take the form of a conversion. Both children and adults can
‘progress’ in this way. Someone who develops away from racism or bigotry makes moral
progress. This will involve changes, not just in the cognitive realm, but likely in all aspects of
moral functioning. Especially when it comes to substantive notions and criteria of moral
progress people will differ about what counts as progress. This is no reason to drop the notion,
however, but all the more reason to continue the conversation.
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